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Abstract
Membership in the Russell 1000 and 2000 Indices is based on a ranking of market
capitalization in May. Each index is separately value weighted such that firms just
inside the Russell 2000 are comparable in size to firms just outside (i.e. at the bottom
of the Russell 1000) but have much higher index weights. These features allow for the
the annual reconstitution of these indices to be used as part of a regression discontinuity
design to identify the effect of stock market indexing. Using this design, I investigate
whether stock market indexing affects corporate tax avoidance. I find no evidence that
firms just inside the Russell 2000 have significantly different effective tax rates than
firms just outside.
1E-mail: alex.young.1@ndsu.edu.
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1 Introduction
The “file drawer” problem refers to the practice of researchers abandoning results that they
believe journals are unlikely to publish [Mervis, 2015]. The belief is supported by evidence
of publication bias in, for example, the social sciences: studies with results that reject the
specified null hypothesis are forty percentage points more likely to be published than stud-
ies that fail to reject the null hypothesis (hereafter “null results”) and are sixty percentage
points more likely to be written up [Franco et al., 2014]. There is some justification for this
publication bias. One does not accept a null hypothesis; one fails to reject a null hypothesis
[Hayashi, 2000]. Furthermore, as stated by political scientist Gary King, “there are many,
many ways to produce null results by messing up” [Mervis, 2015].
Anecdotally, my experience is consistent with the results of Franco et al. [2014]: I began
this project in May 2014, found a null result, and didn’t bother to write anything up. But
really, the “file drawer” problem is stupid, so in this paper, I investigate and fail to reject the
hypothesis that stock market indexing affects corporate tax avoidance. Ex ante, a credible
null hypothesis is that stock market indexing has no effect on corporate tax avoidance because
passive indexers adjust their portfolios mechnically as the underlying index constituents
change; thus, they hold firms regardless of the level of tax avoidance. However, to the extent
that tax avoidance improves firm value and passive indexers are not passive owners, stock
market indexing may increase tax avoidance.
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2 Empirical Framework
2.1 Data
The data on Russell 1000 and 2000 Index constituents come from FTSE Russell.1 The sample
period covers the annual reconstitutions from 1996 to 2012. To compute the measures of
corporate tax avoidance, I use data from Compustat.
2.1.1 Identification Strategy
As described in Chang et al. [2015], the process of Russell 1000 and 2000 Index reconstitu-
tion generates exogenous variation in stock market indexing. On the last trading day in May,
firms are ranked by their market capitalizations. Prior to 2006, the 1000 largest firms were
assigned to the Russell 1000, and the next 2000 firms were assigned to the Russell 2000.2
FTSE Russell then publishes index weights in the end of June based on a measure of market
capitalization that adjusts for publically nontradeable shares.
Each index is separately value weighted such that firms at the top of the Russell 2000 have
significantly higher index weights than firms at the bottom of the Russell 1000, despite being
similar in size. Thus, small variations in market capitalization at the end of May have large,
discontinuous effects on index weights at the end of June. The process of index reconstitution
thus lends itself to a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design. The fuzziness arises because
researcher-constructed rankings of May market capitalization do not perfectly predict index
assignment.3
1I thank Harrison Hong for providing the data.
2After 2006, Russell implemented a “banding” policy to reduce turnover between the indices. The practical
consequence was that there became two cutoffs: one for firms entering the Russell 2000 from the Russell
1000, and another for firms entering the Russell 1000 from the Russell 2000.
3Note that using rankings imputed from June index weights is inappropriate under any circumstance, as
it results in a discontinuity in May market capitalization at the cutoff for Russell 2000 Index membership
[Chang et al., 2015].
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2.2 Research Design
Following Chang et al. [2015], I implement the fuzzy regression discontinuity design by esti-
mating the following with two-stage least squares (2SLS):
R2000i,t = α0 + α1τi,t + α2Ranki,t + α3τi,t × Ranki,t + νi,t
ETRi,t = β0 + β1R2000i,t + β2Ranki,t + β3R2000i,t × Ranki,t + εi,t (1)
where τi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i crosses the threshold for Russell 2000
Index membership in year t and is the instrumental variable for actual index assignment,
R2000i,t. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, and the bandwidth is 200.
ETRi,t is either the cash effective tax rate (CETR) or the GAAP effective tax rate (GETR)
following [Dyreng et al., 2010]:
• CETRi,t is defined as cash taxes paid (Compustat TXPD) divided by pretax income
less special items (Compustat PI - SPI).
• GETRi,t is defined as total tax expense (Compustat TXT) divided by pretax income
less special items (PI - SPI).
If the denominator is zero, then the ETR variables are set to missing. If the ETR variables
are greater than 1 (less than 0), they are set to 1 (0).
3 Results
Table 1 presents the results of estimating Eq. (1). Column 1 shows that firms that cross
the addition threshold are 87% more likely to be added to the Russell 2000 than firms that
stay in the Russell 1000. Column 2 shows that firms that cross the deletion threshold are
86.1% more likely to be deleted from the Russell 2000 compared to firms that stay in the
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Russell 2000. The coefficients on the instrument, τi,t, are significantly different from zero. In
untabulated results, I find that the F -statistics testing the null of instrument insignificance
easily pass the Staiger and Stock [1997] critical value. Thus, there is no evidence that the
instrument is weak.
Columns 3 through 6 show that there is no evidence that firms just inside the Russell 2000
have significantly different cash or GAAP ETRs than firms just outside the Russell 2000 (i.e.
at the bottom of the Russell 1000). Thus, I find no evidence that stock market indexing
affects corporate tax avoidance.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate whether stock market indexing affects corporate tax avoidance.
Using the annual reconstitution of the Russell 1000 and 2000 Indices in a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design, I find no evidence that stock market indexing affects cash or GAAP
effective tax rates.
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Table 1: The effect of stock market indexing on corporate tax avoidance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2000i,t R2000i,t CETRi,t CETRi,t GETRi,t GETRi,t
τi,t 0.870*** 0.861***
(0.021) (0.023)
τi,t × May Rank (Add)i,t 0.000
(0.000)
May Rank (Add)
i,t
0.000*** 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
τi,t × May Rank (Del)i,t -0.000**
(0.000)
May Rank (Del)
i,t
0.001*** 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2000i,t -0.024 -0.020 0.031 -0.004
(0.025) (0.017) (0.021) (0.015)
May Rank (Add)
i,t
× R2000i,t -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
May Rank (Del)
i,t
× R2000i,t -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.056*** 0.083*** 0.264*** 0.212*** 0.279*** 0.288***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 2255 3027 1817 2635 1817 2635
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
This table reports the results of a fuzzy RD design from the following equation. The dependent variable
in columns 1 and 2 is an indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 Index. In columns 3 and 4 (5
and 6), the dependent variable is the cash (GAAP) effective tax rate Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity. The bandwidth is 200. The sample period is 1996–2012.
R2000i,t = α0 + α1τi,t + α2Ranki,t + α3τi,t × Ranki,t + νi,t
QIXi,q,t = β0 + β1R2000i,t + β2Ranki,t + β3R2000i,t × Ranki,t + εi,t
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